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Introduction
The reforms in China over the past 30 years have 
transformed the nature of employment in the world’s 
most populous country. The ‘iron-rice bowl’, whereby 
urban workers were guaranteed a job in the state 
sector (state- and collective-owned enterprises), has 
been effectively dismantled, while other reforms have 
opened the economy and allowed rapid growth in a 
range of industries. These developments, as well as 
increased labour mobility, have resulted in a massive 
expansion in the employment of rural migrants – 
workers whose residence is rural but who typically 
move to the city for much of the year for employment 
opportunities. This has expanded the pool of labour 
available to China’s construction and manufacturing 
sectors, amongst others, and helped China’s economy 
to grow. This article discusses these developments, 
paying particular attention to: the nature of 
employment in China; the role of rural migrant 
workers; and some of the demographic challenges 
that China will confront over the coming decades.
Some Basic Demographic Facts
According to preliminary statistics from China’s 
latest census, China’s mainland population reached 
1.34 billion people in 2010, with the population 
having grown at an annual average rate of 0.6 per 
cent over the past decade – down from 1.0 per cent 
over the previous decade. This slowing in the rate 
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of population growth is significant, and ongoing 
changes to the age structure in China will have 
important implications for China’s labour market. 
The working-age population (ages 15–64) increased 
to 74½ per cent of China’s population in 2010 (from 
around 70 per cent in 2000), reflecting a significant 
reduction in the share of the population below the 
age of 15 (Graph 1). As a result, the dependency 
ratio (defined as the ratio of the population aged 
0–14 or 65 and over to the working-age population) 
has declined to a very low level by international 
standards. United Nations (UN) projections of China’s 
population suggest that the working-age population 
will peak within the next five years and subsequently 
will begin to shrink, while the dependency ratio is 
expected to rise rapidly as the population ages.
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One of the other significant ongoing changes in 
China has been the urbanisation of the population. 
Over the past decade, the share of the population 
living in an urban area increased by 13 percentage 
points to 50 per cent. In 2010, around 220 million 
people lived in a location different from that of 
their official household registration, an increase 
of over 80 per cent from 2000. As discussed later 
in this article, this reflects the rapid expansion in 
the number of rural migrant workers, with some 
estimates suggesting that there were as many as 
100  million rural migrants living and working in 
urban centres during 2010. 
There has also been a rapid shift towards urban 
employment, with the share of workers employed in 
urban areas increasing from just over 20 per cent in 
the late 1970s to 40 per cent by 2009 (Graph 2). The 
difference between the share of urban employment 
(40 per cent) and the urbanisation rate (50 per cent) 
is accounted for by different participation rates in 
rural and urban areas: although there is probably 
significant underemployment in rural areas, 
employment data suggest that just over 65 per cent 
of the rural population is employed compared with 
around 50 per cent in urban areas. 
(Graph 3). There are a couple of potential reasons for 
this fall. The first is the rising enrolment rate in tertiary 
education; the number of new undergraduate 
enrolments increased six-fold between 1998 and 
2009. The second is the relatively low retirement age 
in China, coupled with an increase in the share of the 
population between the ages of 50 and 64. Official 
retirement ages are 60 for males and 50–55 for 
females, and Knight, Quheng and Shi (2010) report 
that in 2002 the actual median retirement age was 59 
for males and 51 for females. Notwithstanding the fall 
in the participation rate, urban employment growth 
has been rapid over the past decade reflecting the 
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Employment Patterns
Economic reforms over the past three decades 
have seen a major shift in the ownership 
structure of employing firms (Graph 4). The share 
of urban employment attributed to state- and 
collective-owned enterprises (SOE and COE) has 
fallen from more than 90 per cent of employment in 
1990 to 30 per cent in 2010.
By the early 1990s, it had become widely apparent 
that staffing levels in many SOEs were considerably 
above what was required. A survey in the mid 1990s 
by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) 
across 13 provincial capital cities suggested that 
15  to 30 per cent of ‘employed’ workers in SOEs 
The urban participation rate (including rural migrant 
workers) is currently estimated to be a little over 
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Graph 4 Graph 5
were effectively redundant (Kai 1995). By 1996, 
more than a third of SOEs were operating at a loss. 
To address overstaffing and low productivity in 
SOEs, the Chinese Government initiated a limited 
program of state-sector lay-offs in 1994 that was 
made national in 1997 (the xiagang reform). Under 
the  xiagang reform, some laid-off workers were 
granted early retirement and early access to SOE 
pension schemes, while others were laid off with 
severance pay for a period of time, the size and 
duration of which depended on the worker’s 
salary, years of service, the nature of their job and 
other working conditions. Between 1995 and 2002, 
the state-sector restructuring led to 36 million 
state-sector workers being laid off (Giles, Park and 
Zhang 2005), with employment in SOEs declining by 
a similar magnitude.
Over the past decade, employment growth in 
the ‘non-state’ sector has been very strong, with 
employment in these firms expanding by over 
110 million persons.
2 The shift in employment away 
from SOEs and COEs to other firm types has been 
strongest in the eastern provinces. 
2  A portion of the growth in non-state sector employment could, 
however, be attributed to the reclassification of some SOEs as limited 
liability companies despite the government retaining control of these 
companies (OECD 2000, pp 17–18). Unfortunately, the official NBS 
data do not allow employment in ‘other firms’ to be split by state- and 
non-state ownership. For a discussion of ownership structure across 
different ownership types, see ADB (2002).
Employment in non-state firms is concentrated 
within a few key industries, with manufacturing 
and wholesale & retail trade each accounting for 
20 per cent of urban firm employment (Graph 5). 
Employment in the state sector is skewed towards 
social services; about half of urban state-sector 
employees work in the education, health, social 
security & social welfare, and ‘public management 
& social organisation’ industries, while just over 
5 per cent of state-sector employment is in the 
manufacturing sector.
Recent Trends in Wages
Data from the NBS suggest the average annual urban 
pre-tax wage was around CNY 30 000 in 2010 (which 
is equivalent to about A$90–95 per week; Table 1). 
Despite widely publicised minimum wage freezes in 
2009, average wages grew at an annual rate of 12 per 
cent between 2008 and 2010. The largest increases 
in wages were recorded in COEs, with wages in SOEs 
also increasing by more than average; non-state 
firms, which pay lower wages on average, increased 
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Table 1: Wages in China 
Nominal wages average annual growth
CNY ’000 Per cent
 2010 2008–2010
Average  29.8  11.7
By ownership
SOE  39.5  12.8
COE  24.4  15.4
Non state- or collective-owned  26.2  11.0
of which
Limited liability  33.1  12.1
Shareholding  46.0  14.1
Foreign-owned  40.2   10.9
HKMT  31.4  11.4
Private  20.8  10.3
Sources: NBS; RBA
Wages for privately owned firms are currently around 
30 per cent lower than the national average while 
wages paid by SOEs are about 30 per cent higher; 
this gap has widened over the past decade (Graph 6). 
Lower non-state sector wages do not seem to reflect 
employment patterns across regions, with data from 
official sources suggesting that the gap between 
state and non-state sector wages is broadly similar 
across provinces and also industries (Graph 7). 
There are a number of possible explanations for the 
gap between state and non-state sector wages. Chen, 











China – Annual Average Wages by Ownership
Nominal, CNY ’000*
*1 996–2001 and 2003–2007 interpolated













































































































































































as Communist Party membership and household 
registration represent labour market barriers that 
generate wage differentials. A further possibility 
is that the wage gap is explained by differences in 
human capital or hours worked. However, Démurger, 
Shi and Yang (forthcoming) argue that the wage 
premium enjoyed by employees of state-owned 
firms cannot be entirely accounted for by these 33 Bulletin | SEPTEMBER QuaRTER 2011
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Graph 8 factors. Another explanation is the potential role of 
rural migrant workers in driving wage differentials 
between the state and non-state sectors, and across 
industries.
Rural–urban Migration
An important trend in China’s labour market over 
the past few decades has been the rapid growth 
in the number of rural migrants working in urban 
enterprises (Graph 8). Prior to the late 1970s, the 
state’s monopoly control of the distribution of living 
necessities and urban employment made it difficult 
for rural citizens to migrate to cities. The hukou 
system (or household registration system) classified 
people by their place of residence, and whether they 
were deemed to have ‘rural’ or ‘urban’ status. Under 
the food rationing system, a person was only eligible 
to receive staple foods if they remained in their 
local hukou area (Chan and Zhang 1999). While the 
food rationing system was subsequently abolished, 
the hukou system remains in place. In general, it is 
difficult for a person with rural household registration 
to migrate permanently and receive an urban 
household registration. Although labour mobility 
has improved over the past few decades, the hukou 
system still provides significant barriers to internal 
migration. In particular, since only those people who 
have local hukou registration are allowed to access 
most welfare services provided by the government, 
such as health care and education services, rural 
migrants are excluded from accessing these services. 
Agricultural reforms that boosted farm productivity, 
combined with a baby boom in the 1950s and 
migration restrictions, led to significant surplus labour 
in rural areas by the 1980s (Li, Liu and Zhang 2003). 
The initial response of the Chinese Government was 
to encourage the development of rural industry 
through township and village enterprises (TVEs). By 
the end of the 1980s, around 95 million workers were 
employed in TVEs.
In 1985, the Ministry of Public Security introduced 
a new system of temporary residency for people 
outside their place of hukou registration. The change 
promoted the internal migration of rural workers, 
whereas the previous policy required work by rural 
labourers in cities to be formally pre-arranged (Chan 
and Zhang 1999). The change of policy resulted in a 
rapid expansion in the migration of rural workers to 
urban centres – by 1989, the number of rural migrant 
workers was estimated to have reached 30 million, 
up from only 2 million in the early 1980s.
A further impetus to migration came from Deng 
Xiaoping’s southern inspection tour in 1992, which 
precipitated a wave of investment and development 
in China that, in turn, led to rapid growth in the 
demand for labour in the southern coastal areas. 
Combined with the development of the private 
sector, the dismantling of the food rationing system 
from the mid 1980s and the relaxation of restrictions 
on internal migration, this helped to encourage 
rapid growth in the number of rural migrant 
workers – by 1993, the number of rural migrant 
workers had reached over 60 million. However, the 
lay-offs precipitated by the xiagang reform led to 
the emergence of urban unemployment by the late 
1990s, causing some local governments to impose 
regulations to restrict rural migration (Zhan 2005). 
Coupled with the effects of the Asian financial crisis, 
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Rural–urban migration expanded again through 
the 2000s as the opening of China’s economy was 
accelerated following its accession to the World 
Trade Organization in 2001. Overall, the economic 
reforms that began in the late 1970s and the 
relaxation of certain aspects of the hukou system 
greatly increased the migration of labour from rural 
to urban areas; there has been a rough doubling in 
the number of rural migrant workers over the decade 
to its current level of just over 150 million.
In 2010, there were a little over 240 million people with 
a rural hukou not working in agriculture, equivalent to 
about 30 per cent of the country’s labour force. A little 
over 60 per cent of these workers had migrated, with 
the remainder staying in their local area – for example, 
to work for a TVE. Of the rural migrants, around half 
have migrated to another province. Comprehensive 
data on inter-provincial migrant worker flows for the 
period 2000–2005 suggest that the source provinces 
of inter-provincial migrants are concentrated in 
the centre and south-west of China – particularly 
Sichuan and Anhui (Figure  1) – while roughly half 
of inter-provincial migrants move to the coastal 
provinces of Guangdong and Zhejiang – where a large 
While the eastern provinces are still the major 
destination for migrant workers, there appears to 
have been a shift in migrant labour away from these 
coastal regions between 2008 and 2009. This shift 
is most evident in the Pearl and Yangtze River Delta 
areas, which absorbed 52 per cent of all migrant 
labour in 2008, but only 42 per cent in 2009. This 
was partly due to the economic effects of the global 
financial crisis deterring migration towards the coast, 
but it could also reflect the gradual shift in economic 
activity towards the central and western provinces 
as central government policies increasingly focus on 
developing these regions further.
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amount of manufacturing activity occurs (Figure 2). 
Given the strong demand for labour along the coastal 
provinces, rural migrants from eastern provinces are 
less likely to migrate to another province. NBS data for 
2009 suggest that migrants from eastern provinces 
are about four times as likely to migrate within their 
home province as to migrate to another province. On 
the other hand, migrants from the central and western 
provinces are more likely to migrate to another 
province than stay in their home province.
Figure 1 Rural–urban Migration: Source Provinces 2000–2005
Total outward migration by province, share of total inter-provincial outward migration35 Bulletin | SEPTEMBER QuaRTER 2011
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Graph 9
Sources: Chan (forthcoming); RBA
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China – Rural–urban Migrant Employment
Share of estimated rural–urban migrant employment*
*R ural–urban migrant employment is based upon estimates of the number
of rural–urban migrants in urban areas for at least six months in the year;
   estimates for 2008–2010
Sources:C han (forthcoming); Herd et al (2010); Ministry of Labor and
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 Figure 2 Rural–urban Migration: Destination Provinces 2000–2005
Total inward migration by province, share of total inter-provincial inward migration
Reflecting the large share of rural migrants in coastal 
provinces, it appears that migrant workers are 
predominantly employed by the non-state sector 
and, in particular, by the manufacturing industry 
(Graphs 9 and 10). Nearly 70 per cent of migrant 
workers are employed in ‘private and individual’ 
firms, although this share appears to have declined 
over the past 10 years. Currently, rural migrants are 
estimated to account for a little over half of urban 
employment in private and individual firms.
Given that migrant workers constitute a far larger 
share of non-state sector employment than of state 
sector employment, it seems plausible that rural–
urban migration might be playing a role in driving 
the wage differentials between these sectors noted 
earlier. Wages for migrant workers tend to be a 
lot lower than average urban wages. In 2009, the 
average migrant earned about CNY 1 700 per month 
for those months that they worked (equivalent to 
around A$60 a week; Graph 11).
3 These workers 
3  However, in 2009 around 50 per cent of rural migrants received 
free accommodation from their employers. Free or subsidised 
accommodation is not captured in the wages data, potentially 
understating the true level of remuneration to migrant workers.
typically spend a portion of the year in their home 
towns and villages. They also typically work long 
hours; the average migrant worked 58½ hours a 
week in 2009, compared with the urban average of 
a little less than 45 hours a week in November 2009.36 ReseRve bank of austRalia
One reason for the relatively lower wages of migrant 
workers is that they typically have lower levels of 
education (Graph 12). In 2009, less than one quarter 
of migrants had completed high school and only 
10 per cent had tertiary qualifications of awny kind. 
By comparison, 70 per cent of registered urban job 
seekers had completed high school, with 30 per cent 
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The Effect of Demographic Change 
on China and Surplus Rural Labour
According to the 2010 revision of the UN’s World 
Population Prospects, the working-age population in 
China is expected to peak in the next five years or so 
and shrink by 20 per cent by 2050, under the UN’s 
central fertility assumptions. The effects of such a 
demographic shift on the labour force may, however, 
be partly offset by an increase in the participation 
rate through later retirements. With fewer children to 
help support parents in their retirement and limited 
financial support from public pensions, it would not 
be surprising if there was a trend for workers to retire 
later. The effect on the urban labour market may 
also be offset by a further expansion in the number 
of rural migrant workers in coming years. However, 
there is much debate as to how much rural ‘surplus’ 
labour remains.
Some contend that China is close to exhausting its 
surplus of rural labour. Such arguments are often 
predicated on reports of rapid wage increases in 
recent years for migrant workers, which could signal 
a tightening of rural labour supply.
4 While there have 
been media reports of migrant worker shortages in 
coastal urban areas since at least 2003, the frequency 
of such reports appears to have increased recently. 
4 Other arguments have been made; see Golley and Meng 
(forthcoming) for a synopsis.
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Others have argued that China still has a large stock 
of surplus rural labour. Using detailed survey data, 
Golley and Meng (forthcoming) show that over the 
past decade wages for rural migrant workers have 
grown at half the rate of wages for workers with 
an urban hukou, suggesting that factors such as 
experience, the level of education and living costs 
could explain increases in normal migrant worker 
wages. Furthermore, Knight et al (2010) argue that 
institutional factors, particularly those that prevent 
rural migrants from accessing most welfare services 
provided by the Government, deter migration, and 
consequently there remains a large pool of potential 
migrant workers. Consequently, these authors claim 
that despite a dramatic increase in migration over 
the past two decades, the number of rural migrants 
could increase further. Using alternative sets of 
assumptions, both Knight et al (2010) and Golley 
and Meng (forthcoming) suggest that an increase 
of roughly 150  million migrants by 2020 – that is, a 
doubling of the current level – is possible.  R
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